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Abstract
We design an experiment to study the implications of information networks
for the incentive to acquire costly information, market liquidity, investors’
earnings and asset price characteristics in a financial market. Social commu-
nication crowds out information production as a result of agent’s temptation
to free ride on the signals purchased by their neighbors. Although informa-
tion exchange among traders increases trading volume, improves liquidity and
enhances the ability of asset prices to reflect the aggregate amount of infor-
mation in the market, it fails to improve price accuracy. Net earnings are
higher with information sharing due to reduced acquisition of costly signals.
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1 Introduction
Knowledge about fundamentals influences security prices. Acquisition of such costly
information is one of the central topics in economics. A long line of research ini-
tiated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrecchia (1982) has investigated the
incentives to acquire costly information and its implications for financial markets.
Using the principle of rational expectations, this literature has shown that investors’
diverse information is reflected in asset prices and individuals incorporate the infor-
mation content of prices into their trading decisions. The information dissemination
and aggregation properties of market organization have been explored at great depth
in the theoretical and experimental literature. However, the important issue of the
possibility of social communication via information networks among investors has
been ignored to date.
Although the significance of the embeddedness of economic activity in social
settings has long been recognized in sociology (Granovetter (1985)), economists
have been sluggish in acknowledging the paramount role played by neighbors and
friends in influencing our beliefs, decisions and behaviors. However, the last two
decades have seen a flurry of studies that have demonstrated that the effects of
social networks on economic activity are abundant and pervasive, including roles in
transmitting information about jobs, product adoption, technologies, and political
opinion (Jackson (2008, 2010)). Several research papers have shown that information
sharing with peers via social networks, word-of-mouth communication among people
with whom we interact on a regular basis and shared education networks play an
important role for investment decision making including stock market participation
and portfolio choices.1 It is now widely recognized that there are many economic
interactions where the social context is not a second-order consideration, but is
actually a primary driver of behaviors and outcomes.
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of information exchange
among investors on individual trader’s decisions to invest in information produc-
tion and subsequently on market outcomes including trading volume and asset price
characteristics. Specifically, we ask the following set of questions. How does so-
1The pertinent studies are briefly mentioned in the next section where we discuss the related
literature.
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cial communication influence the incentives to acquire costly information regarding
stock fundamentals? How does information sharing via networks affect the ability
of market prices to reflect investors’ diverse information as well as the propensity
of prices to reveal the underlying state of nature? What are the implications on
trading volume and trader profits? In order to answer these questions, we design an
experimental asset market with endogenous acquisition of costly information. We
assume two equally likely states of nature, A and B, and a single asset, a Arrow-
Debreu security that provides a payoff only in state A. Prior to trading, individuals
may acquire costly and imperfect signals about the state of nature. Signals are
binary, and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d), conditional on the state.
While laboratory markets are much simpler in structure than actual asset mar-
kets in the field, they provide an invaluable controlled setting that enables the causal
identification of the network structure. An exogenous network of interactions could
be imposed among a group of subjects, and several treatments could be implemented
to isolate the effect of the structure of the network on individual behavior as well
as market outcomes. The novelty of our research stems from the fact that we em-
bed network structures within the framework of Arrow-Debreu security market. We
believe that our research would complement the analysis of financial markets that
uses field data.
What distinguishes our paper from previous studies on information acquisition
is the existence of a network among the traders. Before trading takes place, indi-
viduals can communicate their purchased information to those connected to them
in the network. The network structure is assumed to be exogenous. As emphasized
in Cohen, Frazzini and Malloy (2008), a convenient aspect of social networks is that
they have often been formed ex ante, sometimes years in the past, and their for-
mation is frequently independent of the information to be transferred. We further
assume that information exchange is perfect and non-strategic, such that any ac-
quired information by one individual is automatically exchanged to her connection
and vice versa. We model a society where individuals are embedded in a social
network of long term relationships that took time to form, express mutual trust
and are not easily undone (Granovetter (1985)). In such a society, lying or with-
holding information is extremely costly. As discussed in Han and Yang (2013), one
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can interpret networks as friendships, club memberships, and social media, or more
generally, being connected through the network can also be viewed as using common
information sources, such as newsletters.2
On the one hand social communication is envisaged to reduce the risk of the asset
by enlarging each trader’s information set as well as increasing the informational
efficiency of prices, but on the other hand the expectation of learning from informed
connections and more informative market price also gives rise to a temptation to
free ride on others’ acquired information. In our experiment, we find that, on an
average, the likelihood of acquiring information and the amount of signals purchased
are both decreasing in the number of connections of a trader. Compared to the case
of no information sharing, the proportion of investors not buying any signal rises by
around 55% when information exchange takes place on a complete network. This
possibility of an incentive to free ride has been recently explored theoretically in Han
and Yang (2013) and we complement their study by providing empirical support.
Despite lowering information disparity among investors, social communication
results in more trades and improves market liquidity. With information sharing
among investors, a larger fraction of the available information in the market is im-
pounded into asset prices. While prices typically under-react to the information in
the market, the extent of under-reaction decreases with the density of the informa-
tion network. However, the ability of prices to correctly predict the underlying state
of nature is not enhanced with information sharing. This happens due to the fact
that the strong free riding incentive crowds out information production to such an
extent that the information accuracy of the cumulative signals in the market remains
low. Thus, contrary to conventional wisdom, we show evidence that enhanced in-
formation exchange via social communication does not improve the quality of prices
as forecasting tools.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature and section 3 provides the hypotheses. In section 4, we describe the design
and procedures of the experiment, and in section 5, we present the data. Section 6
concludes.
2Although our study abstracts away from the issues of endogenous formation of networks as
well as strategic information revelation, we stress that these are nevertheless important topics to
be investigated in future studies.
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2 Literature Review
The primary contribution of this paper is in the subject of costly information acqui-
sition in financial markets, a literature that is pioneered by the seminal theoretical
papers by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Verrecchia (1982). If information is
costly to obtain, Grossman (1976) showed that market prices cannot be fully effi-
cient, since fully revealing prices remove any incentive to acquire information. While
the fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium predicts no information acqui-
sition (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) and no trade (Milgrom and Stokey (1982)),
many studies have proved the existence of noisy rational expectations equilibrium in
which the amount of costly diverse information each trader acquires is endogenously
determined (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Verrecchia (1982), Peress (2004)). Some
noise, often introduced through stochastic noise trader demand or variability in sup-
ply of the risky asset, prevents the equilibrium price from fully revealing traders’
private information.
The majority of the experimental asset pricing studies follow Smith, Suchanek
and Williams (1988) and are devoted to the investigation of asset price bubbles and
crashes. In studies based on this design, a market is created for a dividend-paying
asset with a lifetime of a finite number of periods, and the asset structure is common
knowledge. The key finding is that prices greatly exceed the fundamental value for
a sustained temporal duration before finally crashing to prices close to fundamental
values.3 Another class of asset pricing experiments has demonstrated that mar-
kets can disseminate information efficiently (Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1982) and
Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1984)) as well as aggregate private information in
static markets (Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988)). More recently, Bossaerts, Frydman
and Ledyard (2014) examine the relationship between eventual price quality and the
proportion of traders in an economy that has private information by comparing two
theories, one using the Bayes Nash equilibrium, and the other using noisy rational
expectations equilibrium.4
3The phenomenon of asset price bubble has been replicated in numerous studies. Palan (2013)
provides a review of articles that investigate bubbles and crashes in experimental markets.
4For a detailed overview of the experimental asset market literature, see Sunder (1995) and
Noussair and Tucker (2013).
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The experimental literature on endogenous information acquisition in financial
markets is, however, limited. Copeland and Friedman (1992) observe that out-
comes support the fully revealing rational expectations in simple environments in
which the uninformed traders can easily infer the private information of informed
traders. They also find support for non-revealing rational expectations in more
complex (noisy) environments. Similar results are obtained by Sunder (1992). Both
these studies find that when traders submit sealed bids for perfect information, the
market value of information approaches zero. Ackert, Church and Shehata (1997)
investigate the effects of imperfect, private information on prices and find that im-
perfect information is partially disseminated and that imperfect information is in
fact valued by the market participants. Huber, Angerer and Kirchler (2011) have
demonstrated that it is possible for informed traders to obtain lower net profits
on average compared to uninformed traders. A recent study by Page and Siemroth
(2017) reports that traders are more likely to acquire costly information if they have
a larger endowment in cash and assets, if their existing information is inconclusive,
and if they are less risk-averse.5
While the above theoretical and experimental studies have significantly enhanced
our understanding of the aspect of costly information acquisition in financial mar-
kets, the role of information exchange among traders themselves has been ignored so
far. The vital importance of such communication, particularly word-of-mouth com-
munication, among financial market investors has been recognized in Shiller (2000)
and more recently in Shiller (2017). Contemporary theoretical studies find that
social communication via networks improves market efficiency when information is
exogenous (Colla and Mele (2010), Ozsoylev and Walden (2011)). Once information
is endogenously acquired via purchase of costly signals, social communication can af-
fect market outcomes in a way that is opposite to that in the exogenous information
case (Han and Yang (2013)). This happens due to the fact that information exchange
through social networks adversely affects the overall production of knowledge. In
5A related line of research has investigated the capacity of prediction markets to aggregate
existing knowledge. A prediction market is a special type of contingent claims futures market that
is designed with the intention of providing probabilistic predictions about future events. See Healy
et al. (2010) and Page and Siemroth (2017) for recent experimental studies on such markets. Deck
and Porter (2013) provide a survey of laboratory studies on prediction markets.
5
contrast to the existing experimental studies on costly information acquisition, we
introduce information networks among investors. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first paper to study the issue of how social communication affects market
outcomes with costly and endogenous information acquisition in experimental asset
markets.6
Our paper also contributes to the large and growing literature on the effect of
networks on economic and financial decision making, especially in the context of
information sharing. Several empirical studies have documented that the exchange
of information through social networks has important implications for investment
decisions such as stock market participation and portfolio choices. See, for example,
Kelly and O’Grada (2000), Duflo and Saez (2003), Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004,
2005), Ivkovic´ and Weisbenner (2007), Brown et al. (2008), and Cohen, Frazzini
and Malloy (2008), among others. Social connections have also been shown to be
important in spreading information about jobs (Munshi (2003), Bandiera, Barankay
and Rasul (2009)), microfinance (Banerjee et al. (2013)), public health (Kremer
and Miguel (2007)) and aggregating information about poverty status (Alatas et
al. (2016)).7 Our experimental investigation of the consequences of communication
networks among friends and neighbors on the information acquisition incentives and
asset prices complements the above mentioned studies.
3 Hypotheses
The theoretical models utilizing the framework of noisy rational expectations imply
that equilibria with information acquisition exist (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980),
Peress (2004)). Recently, Han and Yang (2013) analyze a rational expectations
equilibrium model of a competitive market in which heterogeneous traders learn
about a risky asset’s payoff from three sources: market price, costly information
6Endogenous information acquisition is an important topic in financial economics, with several
studies applying this concept to understand a wide range of issues, including portfolio choice, home
bias puzzle, mutual funds behavior and large price movements. See Han and Yang (2013) for a list
of references in this literature.
7There are several excellent surveys available on networks in finance (Allen and Babus (2009)),
social-network applications for economic problems (Easley and Kleinberg (2010), Jackson (2008,
2010)), and economic networks in the laboratory (Kosfeld (2004), Choi, Kariv and Gallo (2016)).
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acquisition, and communications via an exogenous social network. They argue that
information sharing with friends over a network has two positive effects on reducing
the risk of the stock. First, it enlarges each trader’s information set and hence the
precision of a stock’s payoff conditional on each agent’s information set increases.
Second, exchanging information among more friends improves the informational
efficiency of the asset price by causing more information to be impounded into the
asset price. This improved market efficiency further reduces the risk of the asset for
everyone.
However, there is a negative effect of social communication when information
acquisition is endogenous and the cost to obtain such information is sufficiently high.
In anticipation of learning from informed friends and more informative market price,
Han and Yang (2013) predicts that traders would have less incentive to incur a cost
and acquire information on their own. This incentive to free ride on others’ acquired
information reduces the total amount of information produced in the society. This
provides the basis for our first hypothesis.
Information Acquisition Hypothesis. The aggregate amount of information
in the market is lower with social communication.
Next, we hypothesize that information sharing among friends would have an
impact on the trading volume in the asset market. Han and Yang (2013) argue the-
oretically that with fewer people choosing to acquire information at a cost when they
are connected to more friends, trading aggressiveness is lower with social communi-
cation which harms liquidity and volume. This is also in line with the market-level
implication from the overconfidence literature (Odean (1999), Barber and Odean
(2001), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)) that there is a positive relationship between
the aggregate amount of information purchased and market trading activity. Addi-
tional justification comes from the observation that communication of private infor-
mation among friends lowers the information heterogeneity among traders, thereby
lowering the divergence in beliefs about the state of nature.
Trading Volume Hypothesis. Market trading volume is lower with social
communication.
A trader’s private information is a critical determinant of the price at which
she places bids and asks in the marketplace. Social communication leads to less
7
divergence in the private information held by traders and thus, the asset price better
reflects the aggregate information present in the market. In other words, with
information sharing among investors, a larger fraction of the available information
in the market is impounded into the asset price. Defining the price informativeness
as the ability of prices to reflect the information available in the market, we have
the following hypothesis.
Price Informativeness Hypothesis. Price informativeness is higher with
social communication.
Finally, we argue that the accuracy of the asset price does not change with
information exchange among friends. The accuracy of asset price is defined as the
difference between the actual value of the asset and the market price measured by
an appropriate distance metric. Social communication results in lower aggregate
amount of information in the market (information acquisition hypothesis), thereby
reducing the information accuracy of the composite signals in the market.8 This will
have a negative impact on the accuracy of asset price. However, at the same time,
the ability of market price to aggregate information efficiently is also increasing with
communication (price informativeness hypothesis). Thus, the effect of information
sharing on price accuracy is ambiguous as two factors (information accuracy and
price informativeness) are changing at the same time with exchange of information
among connections.
Price Accuracy Hypothesis. Social communication does not improve the
accuracy of the asset price.
4 Experimental Design
4.1 Procedures
The data for this study were gathered from eight experimental sessions conducted at
the Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. We had 192 participants
in total, with 24 participants in each session. They were recruited from the popu-
8Information accuracy measures how accurate is the information in the market and is defined
as the difference between the actual value of the asset and the value implied by the available
information in the entire market.
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lation of undergraduate students at NTU from various majors ranging from Social
Sciences, Business and Economics, Humanities, Engineering, and Sciences. No sub-
ject participated in more than one session of this experiment. The sessions lasted
approximately two hours and participants earned on average S$24.40 in addition to
a show-up fee of S$2.9
Upon arrival, subjects were seated at visually isolated computer workstations.
Participants were randomly divided into groups of eight.10 Instructions were read
aloud and subjects also received a copy of the instructions.11 Participants were
prohibited from talking during the experiment and all communication took place
via the experimental software. Each session consisted of two practice periods and
twelve main periods.12 Activity during the practice period did not count toward
final earnings.
We employed the ball-and-urn setup of the experiments conducted by Anderson
and Holt (1997) and followed Page and Siemroth (2017) in explaining the setting to
the participants. At the start of each period, a virtual urn (A or B) was randomly
selected by the computer, with each urn having an equal chance of being chosen.
Both types of urn contained 10 balls in total. Urn A contained 6 black balls and
4 white balls, while urn B contained 4 black balls and 6 white balls. All of this
information was common knowledge to the participants. The realization of the urn
was revealed perfectly to subjects only at the end of a period.
Traders had the opportunity to exchange several units of an asset every period
by participating in a virtual financial market. All accounting and trading were done
in experimental currency units (ECU). The market was computerized and we used
the continuous double auction trading rules (Smith (1962)) implemented with the
z-Tree computer program (Fischbacher (2007)). At the end of each period, one unit
of the asset paid a dividend of either 10 ECU if the underlying urn was A or 0 ECU
if the urn was B.
9Payoffs, inclusive of the show-up fee, ranged from S$17 to S$36 with a standard deviation of
S$3.71.
10Each session had three independent groups with eight subjects in each group.
11A sample copy of the instructions is provided in the Appendix.
12At the end of the instructions phase and prior to the start of the experiment, all participants
had to complete a quiz to ensure that they understood the important concepts and instructions
required for the experiment.
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Each period, all participants started with the same initial endowment of 60 ECU
and 4 assets. The endowment and earnings from one period could not be carried
forward to the next period. That is, each period was independent of the other. Prior
to trading, participants received initial information about the underlying urn. This
information was provided in the form of two balls drawn independently and with
replacement from the underlying urn. That is, each signal was independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d), conditional on the underlying urn (or state of nature).
These two signals were revealed without any cost to traders and were observed
publicly by all participants in a market. This feature ensured that traders started
with a common prior belief about the state of nature.
After observing the initial information, traders could acquire up to 5 additional
draws at the cost of 3 ECU each.13 All participants were given sixty seconds to
decide on how many additional draws they would like to acquire.14 This informa-
tion gathering stage occurred at the same time for each participant and agents did
not observe the results of others’ information purchases at this point. Before the
decision to acquire additional costly information, each participant was shown the
pattern of connections in the form of an undirected graph. Each node in the graph
represented the location of a subject. An edge between two nodes implied that
the traders occupying the two nodes were neighbors. Each trader knew the num-
ber of neighbors that they had. Subjects were told that the information that they
purchase would be shown to their neighbors at the end of the sixty seconds of the
information acquisition stage. Likewise, any additional information purchased by
neighbors would be revealed to the subject as well.15 Thus, when traders decided
on the number of costly signals to acquire, they most likely took into consideration
the expected learning through social communication via their connections.
The ball draws revealed to participants provided them with some information
about the underlying state of nature and hence, the value of the assets. For instance,
13Again, each signal was an i.i.d draw from the underlying urn.
14In this study, we focus on the setup with endogenous acquisition of costly information. We
do not explore the case where information is exogenously given as we believe the implications of
social communication on asset price characteristics are straightforward and less interesting in such
a setting.
15Participants observed their direct neighbors’ information but not the information purchased
by neighbors’ neighbors (or second-order neighbors). This is motivated by the fact that people
usually know and trust their friends well, but not their friends’ friends.
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observing more black ball draws tend to indicate that urn A was the underlying
urn. In the instructions, we briefly explained to each subject about the concept of
posterior probability and the procedure for computation of the posterior. Partici-
pants were not required to compute the posterior themselves. Instead, the computer
program displayed the posterior for each subject according to their individual ball
draws.
After the information acquisition stage was over, participants entered the trading
stage. A trading phase lasted for three minutes, within which all subjects were free
to purchase and sell units of the asset at any time provided that they do not violate
the short-selling (negative holdings) constraint.16 In addition, subjects were required
to maintain a positive cash balance to make any purchases. If engaging in a trade
would violate either the short sale or cash balance constraint, the computer program
prohibited individuals from doing so.17 Throughout the trading stage, pertinent
information such as the profile of draws revealed to them, posterior probability of
the underlying urn being A given their draw profiles, as well as their ECU and asset
balance available for trading were displayed on the trading window of a participant.
Once trading closed, the underlying urn was revealed together with the subjects’
earnings and average transaction price in the period.
Following completion of the last period, subjects were required to complete a
total of ten probability-related quantitative questions designed to assess their quan-
titative skills. They participated in the standard risk-elicitation task (Holt and
Laury (2002)) as well.18 At the end of the experiment, the program randomly se-
lected 3 of the 12 periods for the purpose of payment. The average of the payouts
from these three periods was paid to the subjects.
16To buy (sell) an asset, a trader could either accept the existing sell (buy) offer or create a buy
(sell) offer. Offers could be withdrawn at any time without any cost. In addition to existing buy
and sell offers, participants were also shown a list containing the prices of all completed trades
within the period.
17No borrowing or short sales are standard restrictions in asset market experiments.
18Participants were also asked to answer a questionnaire aimed at collecting additional informa-
tion such as gender, age, prior trading experience, Business and Economics background etc.
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4.2 Treatments
We implemented four treatments and conducted two sessions for each of them. This
resulted in six independent groups per treatment. The treatments differed in the
underlying exogenous structure of information network among traders (see Figure
1). The non-networked treatment resembled the markets considered in earlier stud-
ies with no information exchange between investors. Each participant only observed
the information purchased by herself privately, apart from the two initial signals.
Each trader was connected to the other seven traders in the complete network ses-
sions. Here, participants were able to observe the additional information acquired
by everyone else. In the circle network treatment, traders exchanged additional
information with exactly two other traders. There were two traders who formed the
core and the remaining six traders constituted the periphery in the core-periphery
network treatment. Each core subject was connected to three periphery subjects as
well as the other core participant. The same participants held the core position each
period.19 A periphery subject was connected to one of the two core participants.
Every trader exchanged additional information with their neighbors.
All the three network structures that we study are connected.20 Except the
core-periphery treatment, participants had equal degree within each of the other
treatments: the permutation of network positions does not change the total number
of connections for each participant.21 In contrast, the two core subjects were in
significantly more influential positions than the periphery subjects. Furthermore,
the four network structures also differ in density: 0 in non-networked, 1 in complete
network, 0.29 in circle network and 0.25 in core-periphery network.22
Although the traders started with a common prior belief about the state of
nature, the endogenous decisions to acquire information resulted in information
being dispersed among participants, except in the complete network sessions. When
each trader was connected to every other trader in the market, then regardless of
19This eliminates any repeated game effect on the behavior of the core subjects.
20A network is connected if every pair of nodes i and j is linked by a path and disconnected
otherwise.
21The network structures where every participant has the same degree are also known as “bal-
anced networks”.
22The density of a network is defined as the ratio of actual connections to the total number of
possible connections in the network.
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Figure 1: Treatments - information networks among investors. Each node on the
undirected graph represents an investor and a link between two nodes denotes bidi-
rectional exchange of privately acquired signals by the nodes.
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the amount of information purchased, the available information in the market was
observed by each participant. That is, each trader had the exact same information
set.
We utilized the circle and core-periphery network structures for two reasons.
First, these are the two most widely used incomplete network configurations (see
Choi, Kariv and Gallo (2016)). Several theoretical models on endogenous network
formation provide justification for such structures (see Bala and Goyal (2000) and
Galeotti and Goyal (2010), among others). Second, while these two network con-
figurations have similar densities in our setting, one is balanced while the other is
not. This allows us to explore the impact of information exchange over a balanced
versus unbalanced network on market outcomes. Another aspect is that it is socially
efficient if core players acquire information while periphery players do not. This is
because of the fact that any information acquired by the core player is observed by
four others, while information purchased by a periphery player is seen by only one
other trader. No such asymmetry exists in the circle network where information
obtained by any player is observed by exactly two others.
5 Results
5.1 Information Acquisition
How does information exchange among neighbors affect the incentive to acquire costly
information?
The period-average summary statistics for each treatment is shown in Table 1.
The number of acquired signals per period per subject is highest with no information
exchange and lowest under complete network. The proportion of traders acquiring
at least one signal is also lowest in the complete network treatment. Figure 2 plots
the distribution of information acquisition choices for each of the four treatments.
The distribution in the complete network as well as in the circle network are skewed
towards the left compared to the other two treatments, thereby implying that sub-
jects in the complete and circle treatments purchase less number of signals than the
other two treatments.
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Figure 2: Distribution of information acquisition choices (number of signals acquired
by a subject), by treatments. Each treatment has 576 observations.
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Table 1: Period-average summary statistics across treatments. Standard deviations
are in parentheses.
Non-networked Complete Circle Core-periphery
No. of acquired signals (si) 1.62 0.52 0.91 1.40
(1.67) (0.81) (1.12) (1.26)
1{si > 0} 0.58 0.35 0.53 0.66
(0.49) (0.48) (0.50) (0.47)
Net profit -4.85 -1.56 -2.73 -4.19
(14.19) (13.01) (11.86) (14.49)
No. of transactions 9.86 13.14 8.50 12.11
(4.74) (6.94) (3.15) (5.09)
No. of participants 48 48 48 48
No. of observations 576 576 576 576
Notes: si denotes the number of signals acquired by a subject in a period. 1{si > 0}
takes a value of 1 if a subject acquires at least one draw and 0 otherwise. Net profit is the
difference in the value of trader portfolios at the end and at the beginning of each period.
Number of transactions is calculated at the market level. There are 72 market-level
observations for each treatment.
For a detailed investigation of the determinants of information acquisition be-
havior, we perform regression analysis with several specifications. Table 2 reports
the estimated values of the regression coefficients. Using all data, specification (1)
performs the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of number of information sig-
nals acquired by a subject (si) and specification (2) estimates a logit model with
dependent variable being the dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a subject
acquires at least one draw and 0 otherwise (1{si > 0}). Corresponding models for
only the core-periphery sessions are reported in (3) and (4) specifications in Table
2. While complete and circle are the treatment dummies, core (periphery) equals 1
if the participant is located at the core (periphery) position and 0 otherwise. The
variable “inconclusive initial draw” equals 1 if the initial two draws provided to
subjects at no cost are inconclusive, that is, results in the draw of one black and
one white ball. In this case, the Bayesian posterior probability of urn A is 0.5,
the same as the prior probability. “Inconclusive initial draw” equals 0 if the initial
information is conclusive, that is, both drawn balls are of the same color. When
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the initial information is conclusive, the Bayesian posterior probability of urn A is
either 0.69 (with draw of two black balls) or 0.31 (with draw of two white balls),
in contrast to the prior of 0.5. We also include several demographic variables as
additional regressors.23
The coefficients on the treatment dummies strongly indicate the negative effect
of knowledge sharing on information acquisition behavior, especially in the complete
and circle networks. Compared to the situation without any social communication,
participants acquire less information in the anticipation of free riding on the signals
acquired by their neighbors. A separate specification with number of neighbors as
regressor instead of the treatment dummies show that there is a significant negative
effect on both si and 1{si > 0}.24
Table 3 displays the results of regression of (a) the number of signals acquired
in the market and (b) the number of participants who acquired information in the
market on treatment dummies and average values of the demographic variables in
the market. The possibility of sharing information among investors located on a
network decreases the aggregate number of signals acquired in the market: by 2.7
draws in core-periphery, 6.8 draws in circle and by 9.9 draws in complete network.
Thus, the temptation to free ride on information signals purchased by neighbors
crowds out the production of information in the market. This provides support
for the information acquisition hypothesis and certainly has implications for the
informativeness of the asset price which we discuss in a later section.
Apart from the treatment dummies, several other factors significantly affect the
incentives to acquire information. First, if the initial information provided to sub-
jects is not conclusive, then they are more likely to spend money on gathering
additional information. Second, the period in a session has a negative effect on
the number of signals purchased as well as the likelihood to get informed. Third,
23These variables are risk aversion (measure of how risk averse a subject is; ranges from 1 to 11
with larger values indicating higher risk aversion), age (age of participant in years), male (equals
1 if the participant is male and 0 otherwise), economics/business major (equals 1 if the subject
is pursuing major in Business or Accountancy or Economics), quantitative skill (measure of the
number of correct answers to the questions in quantitative stage; ranges from 0 to 10) and trading
experience (equals 1 if the subject had previous experience of trading in the stock market and 0
otherwise).
24For the sake of brevity, the results of this additional regression are not displayed in any of the
tables.
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Table 2: Regressions of number of signals acquired (si) and 1{si > 0}. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
All data Core-periphery
(1) OLS (2) Logit (3) OLS (4) Logit
si 1{si > 0} margins si 1{si > 0} margins
Complete -1.19*** -1.31*** -0.28***
(0.19) (0.33) (0.06)
Circle -0.70*** -0.17 -0.04
(0.21) (0.30) (0.06)
Core -0.05 1.15* 0.23**
(0.29) (0.66) (0.11)
Periphery -0.40* -0.07 -0.02 -0.55* -1.56** -0.21*
(0.23) (0.33) (0.07) (0.29) (0.67) (0.11)
Inconclusive initial 0.21*** 0.37*** 0.08*** 0.10 -0.03 0.14***
draw (0.05) (0.09) (0.02) (0.18) (0.38) (0.04)
Inconclusive initial 0.45** 0.85**
draw×Periphery (0.21) (0.43)
Risk aversion -0.07** -0.13** -0.03** 0.04 -0.02 -0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.15) (0.03)
Age -0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.00
(0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.09) (0.21) (0.04)
Male -0.10 -0.19 -0.04 0.03 -0.44 -0.09
(0.16) (0.27) (0.06) 0.34 0.68 0.14
Economics/Business -0.38*** -0.64*** -0.14*** -0.50** -0.77 -0.16
major (0.14) (0.23) (0.05) (0.23) (0.50) (0.10)
Quantitative skill -0.02 -0.13** -0.03** 0.03 0.12 0.02
(0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.08) (0.17) (0.03)
Trading experience -0.32 -0.80 -0.17* 0.01 -0.77 -0.16
(0.35) (0.49) (0.1) (0.58) (1.01) (0.22)
Period -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.02*** -0.04** -0.07** -0.01**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
Constant 4.54*** 5.72*** 2.91 2.26
(1.23) (2.02) (1.96) (4.42)
No. of observations 2304 2304 576 576
R2 0.17 0.13
Clusters 192 192 48 48
Notes: The baseline is the non-networked treatment. Apart from the treatment dummies,
the variable “inconclusive initial draw” is included as an independent variable which takes
a value of 1 if the initial two draws provided to participants are inconclusive (that is, if the
balls are of different color) and 0 otherwise. The regressions also include the trading period
as well as several demographic variables. *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level;
***significant at 1% level.
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Table 3: OLS regression of market level variables. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
(1) Smkt. (2) Nmkt.
Complete -9.92*** (0.88) -2.42*** (0.25)
Circle -6.84*** (0.92) -0.11 (0.24)
Core-periphery -2.67*** (0.74) 0.28 (0.20)
Inconclusive initial draw 1.53*** (0.42) 0.59*** (0.14)
Average risk aversion -1.33*** (0.45) -0.75*** (0.15)
Average age -0.78 (0.79) 0.05 (0.20)
Male Ratio 3.51 (2.13) -0.13 (0.68)
Economics/Business ratio -2.85* (1.63) -2.54*** (0.50)
Average quantitative skill 0.91** (0.41) -0.09 (0.16)
Average trading experience -13.63*** (4.26) -3.07*** (1.16)
Period -0.29*** (0.06) -0.13*** (0.02)
Constant 33.99* (18.21) 11.31** (4.84)
No. of observations 288 288
R2 0.57 0.53
Notes: Column (1) shows regression with the dependent variable being the number of
signals acquired in the market (Smkt.). In column (2), the dependent variable is the
number of participants who acquired information in the market (Nmkt.). The baseline
is the non-networked treatment. Apart from the treatment dummies, the variable
“inconclusive initial draw” is included as an independent variable which takes a value
of 1 if the initial two draws provided to participants in a market are inconclusive and
0 otherwise. The demographic variables include average risk aversion, average age,
average quantitative skills of the traders in the market and average trading experience
as well as the ratio of traders being male and the ratio of subjects with an Economics
or Business major in the market. **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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the regressions show that various demographic variables affect the propensity to
gather costly signals. Consistent with the previous literature, we find that, on an
average, participants who are more risk averse acquire less information. A major in
economics or business studies has a significant negative effect on the incentives to
purchase additional information. In general, higher quantitative skills and higher
trading experience are associated with lower information acquisition.
Focusing only on the core-periphery sessions, the specifications (3) and (4) of
Table 2 show that traders occupying the core position acquire a larger number of
signals and are more likely to become informed than subjects located at the periph-
ery. This is in contrast to our general result observed previously that the incentive
to acquire information declines with the number of neighbors. Furthermore, we find
that a trader located at the core position is more likely (equally likely) to acquire
information than the periphery when the initial information is conclusive (inconclu-
sive).25 Also, only the traders located at the periphery respond to the conclusiveness
of initial draws, and traders at the core site acquire additional information never-
theless.
Although counter-intuitive, our results provide evidence that participants at the
core invest more in information gathering activity than the ones at periphery, even
without any immediate benefits. A potential explanation is that the participants po-
sitioned at the core are aware of their influential location in the network which makes
them pro-active than the ones at periphery. The positive effect on the information
acquisition decision of participants at the core results from the understanding that
information acquired by them has a higher social benefit than the signals purchased
by the agents at the periphery. The incentive to free ride is outweighed by this
positive effect.
Validating our information acquisition hypothesis, we have the following result.
Result 1: Information exchange among neighbors gives rise to incentive to free
ride on others’ acquired costly signals and results in lower overall amount of infor-
25When the initial information is inconclusive, to investigate if there is a difference in information
acquisition between participants located at the core and periphery positions, we test the null
hypothesis that the sum of coefficients of the variables Periphery and “Inconclusive initial draw
× Periphery” is 0 for each specification. The p-values are 0.77 and 0.37 for si and 1{si > 0},
respectively.
20
mation in the market.
5.2 Trading Volume and Liquidity
How does social communication affect market trading volume and liquidity?
Table 1 shows that the average number of transactions in a market is not lower
with social communication. In fact, on average, 13.14 trades take place in a market
in the complete network treatment, much higher than the non-networked sessions. In
order to understand more on the impact of social communication on trading volume,
we conduct an OLS regression of market trading volume on the total number of
signals in the market, treatment dummies, Bayesian posterior and trading period.26
The results are displayed in Table 4. Information sharing has a significant positive
effect on market trading activity. At the same time, larger information acquisition
in the market is associated with larger trading volume. Generally, we observe that
more favorable information in the market (indicated by a higher Bayesian posterior)
is typically associated with less trading activity. Indeed, with a higher likelihood of
occurrence of state A (and hence a payoff of 10 for each unit of the asset), traders
would be reluctant to sell their assets.
We also calculate the average bid-ask spread, with the average count in one
trading period taken as a single observation. The value of the average spread is
0.60 for non-networked, 0.19 for complete, 0.40 for circle and 0.34 for core-periphery
sessions.27 The denser the information network, the lower the bid-ask spread. Thus,
higher transaction volume with information sharing is also accompanied by narrower
bid-ask spread. This points towards lower transaction costs and higher liquidity
with social communication. Rejecting the trading volume hypothesis, we have the
following observation.
Result 2: Social communication improves market liquidity and results in higher
market trading volume.
Even after controlling for the aggregate information in the market, nature of in-
26The Bayesian posterior probability gives the posterior probability of urn A given all draws in
the market.
27The difference between non-networked and complete treatment is statistically significant (at
5% level) while the difference in values between non-networked and each incomplete network is
not significant.
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Table 4: OLS regression of market trading volume. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses.
(1) (2)
Smkt. 0.34*** 0.30***
(0.07) (0.07)
Complete 6.60*** 2.83***
(1.12) (0.95)
Circle 0.95 2.04**
(0.67) (0.95)
Core-periphery 3.10*** 2.42***
(0.72) (0.71)
Bayesian posterior -4.59*** -3.75***
(0.92) (0.87)
Period 0.09 0.07
(0.08) (0.07)
Constant 6.85*** 43.96***
(1.24) (6.82)
Observations 288 288
R2 0.23 0.41
Notes: The dependent variable is the market trading volume in a period. Column
(2) includes demographic variables as additional regressors. The baseline is the non-
networked treatment. Bayesian posterior is defined as the posterior probability of urn
A given all draws in the market. **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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formation (as captured by the Bayesian posterior) and the demographic variables of
the participants, market volume increases with social communication. This is a puz-
zling result which suggests that trading is not primarily motivated by information
disparity. If it did, we would have observed far less trading activity in our treat-
ments with information exchange than the non-networked sessions. One plausible
justification could be that social communication fundamentally changes the type of
traders such that it leads to a surge in irrational trades. We define such trades as
those which violates the following condition: trading is performed at a price > (<)5
if the individual Bayesian posterior > (<)0.5.28 The proportion of irrational trades
is 0.45 in non-networked, 0.21 in complete, 0.33 in circle and 0.36 in core-periphery
sessions, implying that with higher volume of trading, social communication in fact
lowers the incidence of trade executions in the direction opposite to the one pointed
by the individual Bayesian posterior.
We argue that result 2 is mainly driven by an adverse selection problem faced
by investors in a financial market. An agent faces this problem since another trader
agreeing to trade at the agent’s ask or bid price may be trading because he knows
something that the agent does not. Adverse selection might prevent certain transac-
tions from taking place if the investor believes that she might suffer losses by trading
with someone having superior information. Social communication lowers the diver-
gence in private information, thereby making this adverse selection problem less
severe. With information exchange over a complete network, no such problem exists
and market trading activity is highest. The issue of adverse selection is deep rooted
in the financial economics literature. In a related but different context, Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) identify a similar problem faced by a specialist while trading with
a customer with superior information.
5.3 Price Informativeness
How does sharing information with neighbors impact the ability of asset prices to
reflect the cumulative information available in the market?
In order to measure the fundamental value of the asset in our setting, for each
28Individual Bayesian posterior calculates the posterior probability of urn A taking into account
only the information available to an individual trader.
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Figure 3: Average prices conditional on the Bayesian posterior (E(Price|Bayesian
posterior)) in the market, for each of the four treatments.
market, we first calculate the Bayesian posterior probability of urn A given all
draws in the market. This posterior multiplied by 10 provides the risk-neutral
fundamental value of the asset. Note that this value differs across markets due
to the variation in the number of signals acquired as well as the difference in the
information revealed by these signals. Taking the information acquisition decisions
as given, this Bayesian posterior times 10 also gives the fully revealing rational
expectations price. Figure 3 plots the expectation of the market price conditional on
the Bayesian posterior (E(Price|Bayesian posterior)) in each of the four treatments.
Visual inspection suggests that prices follow the fundamental value more closely in
the complete network treatment than the other treatments.
We define the linear absolute deviation (LAD) in a market as the absolute dif-
ference between the mean price and the fully revealing price, i.e, LAD = |Mean
price - 10(Bayesian posterior)|. In order to compare the precision of prices to track
the fundamental values in the sessions with information sharing as against the non-
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Table 5: OLS regression of linear absolute deviation (LAD). Robust standard errors
are in parentheses.
Coefficient Standard error
Complete -1.19*** (0.19)
Circle -0.68*** (0.21)
Core-periphery -0.42* (0.23)
Period -0.02 (0.02)
Constant 2.19*** (0.22)
Observations 286
R2 0.12
Notes: The dependent variable is the linear absolute deviation (LAD) which is defined
as the absolute difference between the mean price and the fully revealing price in a
period. The baseline is the non-networked treatment. The independent variables are
the treatment dummies and period. *significant at 10% level; ***significant at 1%
level.
networked sessions, we perform a regression with the LAD as the dependent variable
and the treatment dummies as the regressors. Table 5 reports the results. We find
that the LAD is significantly lower with social communication, indicating that on
average, sessions with information exchange have more precise prices. In fact, the
denser the network, the lower is the LAD.
Figure 3 tends to indicate that prices typically under-react to the information
in the market: prices are closer to 5 (which is the value corresponding to the prior
of 0.5) than the fully revealing values. In other words, prices are less extreme than
the fundamental values suggested by the available information in the market. Using
a market as an observation, Table 6 provides the average values of under-reaction
across treatments where the under-reaction is measured as (fundamental value -
mean price) if posterior > 0.5, (mean price - fundamental value) if posterior is < 0.5
and 0 if posterior equals 0.5. Under-reaction is significant except in the complete
network sessions. With each period as an observation, the last column of Table
6 displays the p-values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the null hypothesis that
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Table 6: Average under-reaction across treatments.
Treatment Mean s.d. min. max. p-value
Non-networked 1.69 1.83 -3.00 6.41 0.00
Complete -0.14 1.02 -2.94 2.91 0.29
Circle 0.35 1.66 -3.27 4.91 0.06
Core-periphery 0.81 1.89 -2.85 6.46 0.00
Notes: For each period, under-reaction is measured as (fundamental value - mean
price) if posterior > 0.5, (mean price - fundamental value) if posterior is < 0.5 and 0
if posterior equals 0.5. Columns 1-4 present the average (mean), standard deviation,
maximum and minimum values. P -values from Wilcoxon signed-rank test of values be-
ing equal to zero are displayed in the last column. Each treatment has 72 observations,
except the non-networked one which has 70.
under-reaction is zero for each treatment. Average under-reaction value is lower
with information sharing than without (with Mann-Whitney p-values < 0.01 for
binary comparison between non-networked and each of the other three treatments).
In fact, the extent of under-reaction decreases as the density of the information
network increases. At the very extreme, prices do not under-react when traders can
share information with everyone else.
Supporting the price informativeness hypothesis, we have the following finding.
Result 3: A larger fraction of the available information in the market is reflected
in asset prices with social communication. In general, the higher the density of the
communication network, the closer are prices to the fully revealing value.
Although price informativeness is higher with information exchange, prices do
not reflect the available information immediately. The large number of transactions
due to improved liquidity with social communication (result 2) facilitates the infor-
mation aggregation process with prices converging towards the fundamental value.
Figure 4 shows the individual transaction LAD with the transaction number on the
x-axis. The LAD is declining with additional trades with information exchange, es-
pecially for complete and circle treatments. Opposite is true for the non-networked
sessions with the prices moving away from the fundamental value with subsequent
trades. Statistically, Kendall’s Tau is negative (-0.19) and significant (at 1% level)
in the complete network. While the coefficients of Tau are insignificant in the other
three treatments, it’s value is positive only in the non-networked sessions.
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Figure 4: Individual transaction LAD as a function of the order of transaction, for
each of the four treatments.
Result 4: The higher volume and improved liquidity with social communication
increases price informativeness.
5.4 Price Accuracy
Is the propensity of asset prices to reveal the true state of nature affected by the
exchange of information among traders?
A typical way to gauge the quality of the transaction prices as forecasting tools
is to evaluate their calibration, that is, whether they are good estimates of the
likelihood of the predicted event (Page and Clemen (2013), Page and Siemroth
(2017)). Figure 5 shows the evidence on calibration for each of the four treatments.
It displays the frequency of the outcome being urn A conditional on the value of the
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Figure 5: The frequency of outcome being urn A conditional on the observed trans-
action prices (E(Outcome|Price)) in the market, for each of the four treatments.
The 95% confidence intervals are displayed as well.
observed prices. Figure 5 reveals that prices are unbiased forecasts of the outcome
frequencies, that is, we cannot reject the hypotheses that frequencies (times 10)
are equal to prices for most of the transaction prices in each treatment, except
possibly at the extreme values. However, the calibration seems to be best for the
sessions with no information exchange with the frequencies being remarkably close
to the E(Outcome|Price)= Price
10
line. Surprisingly, the fit does not improve with
information networks.
To explore further, we perform an OLS regression with the forecast error as
the dependent variable and the treatment dummies as the regressors. The forecast
error each period is defined as the absolute difference between the mean transaction
price and the true value of the asset. If the urn is A (B), true value equals 10(0).
Column (1) of Table 7 displays the results of the regression. The coefficients on the
treatment dummies are all insignificant, implying that compared to the situation
without any communication, none of the treatments with information exchange aid
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Figure 6: Effect of social communication on the precision and accuracy of asset
prices.
in increasing the accuracy of the transaction prices in the market. Thus, supporting
the price accuracy hypothesis, we have the following result.
Result 5: Social communication does not improve the ability of prices to reveal
the underlying state of nature.
Results 1 and 3 together can provide an explanation for the above observation.
Even though social communication aggregates information better (result 3), the total
number of signals in the market is less (result 1) which results in the larger bias of
the cumulative amount of information in the market. As information is imperfect
in our setting, signals in the market may be systematically biased. For example,
even if the underlying urn is A (that is, there is a higher probability of drawing
black balls), it is still possible to end up with more white balls since these are drawn
independently and with replacement. Depending on the state of the nature and the
value of the Bayesian posterior, the information in the market can be categorized as
accurate (posterior> 0.5 and underlying urn is A or posterior< 0.5 and underlying
urn is B), misleading (posterior< 0.5 but underlying urn is A or posterior> 0.5 but
underlying urn is B) or inconclusive (posterior= 0.5).
Low information accuracy corresponds to higher cases of misleading information
in the market. Indeed, the percentage of instances with cumulative information in
the market being misleading increases with social communication in our data set
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Table 7: OLS regression of forecast error. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2)
Forecast error Forecast error
Complete -0.02 -0.48*
(0.37) (0.28)
Circle -0.24 -0.41
(0.36) (0.30)
Core-periphery -0.32 -0.52*
(0.35) (0.30)
Accurate information -2.49***
(0.33)
Misleading information 0.98**
(0.40)
Period -0.07* -0.03
(0.04) (0.03)
Constant 4.46*** 5.88***
(0.35) (0.42)
Observations 286 286
R2 0.02 0.43
Notes: The dependent variable is the forecast error each period (defined as the absolute
difference between the mean transaction price and the true value of the asset). The
baseline is the non-networked treatment. The independent variables are the treatment
dummies and period. Column (2) also includes “accurate information” (which takes a
value of 1 if posterior> 0.5 and underlying urn is A or posterior< 0.5 and underlying
urn is B and 0 otherwise) and “misleading information” (which takes a value of 1 if
posterior< 0.5 but underlying urn is A or posterior> 0.5 but underlying urn is B and
0 otherwise). *significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 1%
level.
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with 24% in the non-networked, 31% each in the circle and core-periphery and 40%
in the complete network treatment. Thus, with social communication, while prices
are more precise (mean prices are closer to the full information Bayesian posterior),
the posterior itself is farther away from the actual outcome due to lower aggregate
number of signals (and information bias is larger). This argument is summarized in
Figure 6 which depicts the trade-off in terms of precision of prices and information
bias. Taken together, the quality of prices as forecasting tools remains the same with
information exchange. Table 7 also shows that including the nature of information
increases the fit of the model substantially, acknowledging that accurate (misleading)
information is associated with lower (higher) forecast error.
5.5 Value of Information: Trader Profits
Do informed traders obtain higher returns compared to uninformed ones? Are
traders better off with information exchange than without?
We calculate the net profits of a trader i in a period p as ∆ECUip+10∆Assetsip
if the urn was A and ∆ECUip if the urn was B. ∆ECUip measures the final (post-
trade) cash endowment minus the initial cash endowment and it accounts for the
information acquisition costs as well as profits from trading. ∆Assetsip denotes the
stock balance at the end of the period minus the initial stock endowment. Thus,
net profit is the difference in the values of trader portfolios at the end and at the
start of each period.
With net profits as the dependent variable, we perform OLS regression for dif-
ferent specifications. We also include the dummy variable “urn” which takes a value
of 1 if the underlying urn was A and 0 otherwise. The results are shown in Table
8. Column (1) results show positive and significant effect of the complete and circle
dummies. This suggests that social communication tends to increase traders’ net
profits. However, when we further control for the number of signals acquired by a
trader and signals acquired by neighbors (as in specifications (2) and (3)), the coef-
ficients of treatment dummies become insignificant. Number of signals acquired has
a significant negative effect on net profits: an increase in the purchase of one more
signal lowers net profits by 2.9 units, which is almost the same as the acquisition
cost of 3 ECUs. Regressions of net profits for each individual treatment show that
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purchase of an additional signal lowers net profits by 2.5 units in the non-networked,
3.3 in the complete, 2.5 in the circle and 3.4 in the core-periphery sessions. This
implies that any positive effect of social communication on net profits is due to the
savings of information cost from less purchase of costly signals. This is consistent
with our finding in section 5.1.
The fourth column of Table 8 displays results for the regression when we control
for the informative content of the available cumulative signals in the market as well.
Accuracy of information has a positive and significant effect on net profits (increases
net profits by 1.9 points) while misleading information decreases net profits signif-
icantly (by almost 3 points). This provides support that information is valuable
when it is accurate. However, since there are also several instances of information
being misleading, the overall value of information is not positive.
We also estimate different regression models with gross profits as the dependent
variable. For the sake of brevity, we do not include the results of all these regressions
in the tables. The number of signals acquired does not affect the gross profits
of a trader with both informed and uninformed investors earning similar profits.
Together with the observations on net profits earlier, the inability of informed traders
to recover the information costs provides a possible explanation for the reduction
in information acquisition over time (see the negative and significant coefficients of
“period” in Tables 2 and 3). Gross profits neither differ across the four treatments
nor with the number of neighbors of a subject. Within the unbalanced core-periphery
sessions, we find that being located at an influential position does not result in
higher profits than the traders on the periphery. The only variables that affect gross
profits significantly are the dummies on information accuracy: accurate information
has positive effect while misleading information has negative impact.
Result 6: Informed traders fail to recuperate the costs of information acquisi-
tion, and obtain same gross returns compared to uninformed traders. Social com-
munication increases traders’ earnings via cost savings from lower information ac-
quisition.
32
Table 8: OLS regression of net profits. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urn -0.11 0.00 -0.02 0.13
(0.89) (0.89) (0.89) (0.89)
Complete 3.29*** -0.60 -0.51 -0.41
(1.07) (0.98) (1.04) (1.03)
Circle 2.13** -0.27 -0.27 -0.2
(1.05) (0.92) (0.97) (0.94)
Core 0.67 -0.42 -0.29 -0.51
(1.90) (1.86) (1.87) (1.85)
Periphery 0.69 -0.58 -0.58 -0.41
(1.13) (0.93) (0.92) (0.91)
si -2.82*** -2.90*** -2.89***
(0.25) (0.27) (0.26)
sneighborsi 0.22 0.19 0.22
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Accurate information 1.87***
(0.65)
Misleading information -2.94**
(1.28)
Constant -4.80*** -0.28 5.43 4.4
(1.06) (0.88) (4.63) (4.52)
Demographic variables included No No Yes Yes
Observations 2304 2304 2304 2304
R2 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.10
Clusters 192 192 192 192
Notes: Column (1) shows regression on “‘urn” (which takes takes a value of 1 if the
underlying urn was A and 0 otherwise) and treatment dummies, while columns (2) and
(3) report the results from including the number of signals purchased by the subject
(si) and number of signals purchased by neighbors (s
neighbors
i ) as independent variables
as well. Last column includes “accurate information” and “misleading information”
as additional regressors. The baseline is the non-networked treatment. **significant
at 5% level; ***significant at 1% level.
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6 Conclusion
We systematically investigate the effects of the possibility of social communication
on incentives to acquire costly information as well as on the characteristics of secu-
rity prices. We report data from a series of laboratory markets for an asset whose
terminal payoff is contingent upon an unknown state of the world. Prior to trad-
ing, investors may purchase imperfect signals themselves and learn from their peers
through an exogenous information network. Previous studies on experimental asset
markets consider traders to be isolated which fails to take into account the aspect
of social communication that is ubiquitous in today’s world. When information is
costly to obtain, the probability of acquiring information and amount of signals
purchased decreases with the number of neighbors of an investor. We provide evi-
dence that ignoring the investors’ information networks results in overestimation of
the amount of information available in the market. Due to cost savings from lower
information acquisition, communication network increases traders’ earnings.
While social communication results in reduced information dispersion among
individuals, this lower disparity in knowledge about fundamentals does not translate
into lower trading activity. To explain this apparently puzzling result, we put forth
an adverse selection hypothesis. Certain desirable trades do not take place if an
individual believes that she might suffer losses by trading with another agent with
superior information. As investors exchange information among themselves, the
problem of adverse selection weakens and this facilitates more trading and increases
liquidity.
We observe that prices typically under-react to the information in the market.
However, this extent of under-reaction is decreasing in the density of the information
network. When information flows on a complete network, prices no longer under-
react and converge to the fully revealing value. The increased trading activity with
social communication aids in the ability of prices to reflect the available information
in the market. However, the quality of asset prices as forecasting tools remains the
same with communication, driven by the fact that social communication results in
crowding out of information production. Thus, although the precision of asset prices
is enhanced due to increased exchange of information among traders, price accuracy
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does not improve.
If the knowledge generated from costly acquisition is valuable for the society,
then our results suggest that sharing of information should be discouraged. For ex-
ample, if the nodes of the information network are research and development (R&D)
divisions of linked financial institutions, then the information exchange among them
should be regulated by the relevant authorities. Otherwise, the amount of socially
beneficial information might be too slender.
The Arrow-Debreu security market design with networked information flows used
here is an innovation to laboratory markets that makes it possible to address other
important issues with respect to network structure, trading and asset prices. For
example, instead of exchange of private information about fundamentals, a link
between investors could mean the exchange of information regarding real-time port-
folios among peers, or simply, word-of-mouth communication among traders. Future
research could also investigate the implications of neighborhood choice on the incen-
tives to acquire costly information, and consequently on asset price properties. In
our experiments, the network structure is exogenous and remains static throughout.
Recent research on endogenous formation of networks has yielded novel insights in
the context of cooperation (Rand, Arbesman and Christakis (2011)) and coordina-
tion (Riedl, Rohde and Strobel (2016)). An immediate extension of our experiments
would be to allow for the co-evolution of the information network. Finally, we fo-
cused on a network of trusted friends who honestly reveal their private information.
It would be interesting to study strategic information transmission, including the
possibility of lying and manipulation of information revealed to neighbors. More
generally, the issue of voluntary disclosure of information could be studied in our
framework as well.
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APPENDIX (For Online Publication)
Experimental Instructions29
GENERAL INFORMATION
Dear participant, welcome to our experiment. Please pay attention to the
information provided here and make your decisions carefully. If at any
time you have questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to
you in private.
Please note that unauthorized communication is prohibited. Failure to adhere
to this rule would force us to stop the simulation and you may be held liable for the
cost incurred in this simulation. You have the right to withdraw from the study at
any point in time, and if you decide to do so your payments earned will be forfeited.
By participating in this study, you will be able to earn a considerable amount of
money. The amount depends on the decisions you make.
At the end of this session, this money will be paid to you privately and in cash.
It would be contained in an envelope (indicated with your unique user ID) together
with a payment receipt acknowledging that you have been given the correct payment
amount.
Each of you will be given a unique user ID and it will be clearly stated on
your computer screen. At the end of the study, you will be asked to fill in your
user ID and other information pertaining to your earnings from this study in the
consent form. Please fill in the correct user ID to make sure that you will
get the correct amount of payment.
Your anonymity will be preserved for the study. You will only be identified
by your user ID in our data collection. All information collected will strictly be
kept confidential for the sole purpose of this study.
29These instructions are from the circle treatment.
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PAYMENT
There are three sections in this experiment and your total payoff from the ex-
periment will be as follows:
1. The earnings made from decisions in Section 1 & 2 will be in terms of Ex-
perimental Currency Units (ECU) and these earnings in ECU will then be
converted to Singapore dollars (SGD) for your payment with the following
exchange rate: 4 ECU = 1.00 SGD.
2. The earnings made from decisions in Section 3 will be in terms of SGD.
There will also be a separate show-up fee of SGD$2, on top of the payment from
your experiment.
In summary, your payment will be as follows:
SECTION 1A- EXPLANATION OF “BALL & URN” SETUP
You are going to take part in a virtual financial market. In this market, you will
be able to buy or sell an asset. The currency used in this market is called ECU.
There will be 12 periods in this section and your final payoff for this section will be
given by the average of the payouts from 3 randomly chosen periods out of the 12
periods.
In financial markets, asset dividends depend on events which are still unknown
to the trader. In this experiment, we represent the uncertain market conditions
through the random selection of urns with different compositions of colored balls.
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There are two types of urns (A & B):
Urn A contains 6 black balls and 4 white balls, while urn B contains 4 black
balls and 6 white balls. In every period, each urn has an equal probability of
being chosen as the underlying urn. You will not be informed of the chosen urn.
You will have the opportunity to buy or sell units of an asset which will be worth:
• 10 ECU if the underlying urn is urn A
• 0 ECU if the underlying urn is urn B
Before the trading stage begins, you will receive some information about the
composition of the underlying urn. Each participant will be able to see 2 randomly
drawn balls from the underlying urn. Note that each drawn ball is placed back into
urn before the next ball is drawn. The initial 2 balls seen by every participant will
be the same.
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You will have the opportunity to acquire additional information by drawing
additional balls from the underlying urn at a cost. Similarly, note that each drawn
ball is placed back into urn before the next ball is drawn.
You will be connected to a number of participants whom you will exchange your
acquired information with these participants are known as your neighbours. The
additional information you acquired will be revealed to you as well as your
neighbours. Likewise, additional information acquired by your neighbours will be
revealed to you.30
30For the non-networked sessions, participants were informed that their acquired information
was only known to them.
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Next, you will enter the trading stage where you will be able to buy or sell the
assets. At the end of the trading stage, the underlying urn will be revealed and the
value of your assets for that period will be determined. If the urn is A, each asset
will be worth 10 ECU. If the urn is B, each asset will be worth 0 ECU.
How can you interpret the drawn balls?
The balls drawn provide an indication on whether urn A or urn B is the under-
lying urn.
Based on the initial 2 draws, the probability that the underlying urn is A is
calculated as follows:
Probability of urn A being the underlying urn given the following drawn balls:
Hence, if two black balls have been drawn, there is 69% chance of urn A being
the underlying urn. If one black ball and one white ball have been drawn, there is
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50% chance of urn A as the underlying urn. If two white balls have been drawn,
there is 31% chance of urn A as the underlying urn.
Note that the system will compute and display the above mentioned
probability. You do not need to compute this probability yourself.
In summary, having more black balls tend to indicate urn A as the underlying
urn. If additional information has been acquired, the system will compute and
update the corresponding probability for you.
You should make use of this computed probability to help you in assessing the ex-
pected value of the asset. If the computed probability of urn A being the underlying
urn is 0.69, the expected value of each asset should be given by:
(0.69× 10ECU) + (0.31× 0ECU) = 6.9ECU
This expected value can then be used as a guide for the price at which you want
to buy or sell this asset during the trading period.
SECTION 1B- THE EXPERIMENT
We will now explain the rules of the experiment in detail. All participants in
the experiment will be divided into 3 groups. In each group, there are 8 traders
and you will be one of them. You and your group members will participate in an
asset market in which you will trade units of the asset that earns dividend in each
period. Each period of the experiment consists of a two-stage decision making
process. In the first stage, you would be allowed to acquire additional information
on the asset at a cost. In the second stage, you will trade units of the assets in a
market setting.
There will be 12 independent periods in the experiment. In each period, the
underlying urn may be different. For instance, the urn may be A in the 1st period
with each asset being worth 10 ECU but the urn may be B in the 2nd period with
each asset being worth 0 ECU. In every period, each urn has an equal probability
of being chosen as the underlying urn. Balls drawn from the urn will give you some
hint about the value of the assets in each period. At the start of every period, all
traders will see the same two initial draws (at no cost) and each trader will
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have the option of acquiring additional balls at some cost. Note that the additional
balls you acquire can only be seen by you and your neighbours.
All traders have the same initial endowment of 60 ECU and 4 assets. Note
that at the start of each period, the initial endowment will be reset and earnings
from each period cannot be used in the next period. That is, each period is a fresh
start.
Before the experiment starts, you will be provided with a figure on your screen
(as shown below).31
This figure shows two things:
1. It shows the pattern of connections within your group. Each node represents
the location of a member in a group. You are located at one of the nodes
shown in the figure. A line joining two nodes together implies that the two
members occupying the two nodes are neighbours. Note that in each period,
you may or may not be located at the same node and may or may not have
the same neighbours as in the previous period. Furthermore, do note that
you will not be told who you are connected with as well as who the rest are
connected with.
2. The information that you acquire will be shared with your neighbours in this
31The network structure shown was different for complete and core-periphery treatments. No
figure was displayed for non-networked sessions.
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structure. Likewise, additional information acquired by your neighbours will
also be revealed to you.
The 1st screen of the experiment will show you a summary containing the fol-
lowing information:
1. Initial two draws
2. Probability that the urn is A based on the two initial draws
3. Initial endowment in money and assets
4. No. of neighbours you have
An example of the 1st screen is as follows:
In this example, none of the 2 initial public draws were black balls. You do not
have to make any decision on this screen. Just click “ok” once you have read the
information.
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SECTION 1C- ACQUIRING INFORMATION
The second screen of each round of the experiment provides you with the oppor-
tunity to pay to obtain additional draws from the urn. The cost of acquiring one
additional ball is 3 ECU. The more additional balls you decide to obtain, the
more information you will have about the underlying urn as well as the value of as-
set. You will be given a duration of 1 minute to decide on how many more balls you
would like to draw. In the screen, you will be required to enter a number between
0 (do not want to obtain additional draws) and 5 (purchase 5 additional
draws) and click “ok”. Failure to click “ok” within the stipulated time will
result in 0 draws obtained.
Below is an example of this screen:
The third screen gives you the results of the additional draws if you or your
neighbours have decided to obtain any:
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In this example, you have decided to obtain 2 additional balls and 1 out of the
2 balls was black. Your neighbours have also obtained 6 additional balls, of which
5 of them were black. Adding all draws together (including the initial 2 draws), 6
out of 10 balls are black. Now, you have some idea on the value of assets. Trading
starts once all traders click “ok”.
SECTION 1D- TRADING STAGE
In this stage, we have a market in which you can buy or sell units of an asset
from/to other traders.
Rules of the Experimental Market
During the trading period, you may buy or sell units of the asset.
To buy an asset:
1. You can accept a sell offer from other traders under the list of sell offers.
Note that a sell offer always offers one asset available for purchase and it
specifies the price at which you can buy the asset. For example, if you accept
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another traders sell offer of 7 ECU, your ECU balance will be reduced by 7
and you will have one more asset.
OR
2. You can create a buy offer, which specifies a price at which other traders
can sell one asset to you. Note that you successfully buy an asset only if your
buy offer is accepted. If nobody accepts your buy offer, then you do not gain
more assets.
Note that if you want to buy more than one asset, you will have to accept more
sell offers, or create more buy offers.
To sell an asset:
Selling assets is similar to buying:
1. You can accept a buy offer from other traders under the list of buy offers.
For example, if you accept a buy offer at a price of 5 ECU, then your ECU
balance will be increased by 5 and you will have one less asset. Similarly, each
buy offer only involves one asset.
OR
2. You can create a sell offer, which specifies a price at which other traders
can buy one asset from you. Note that you successfully sell an asset only if
your sell offer is accepted. If nobody accepts your sell offer, then you do not
have less assets.
Similarly, if you want to sell more than one asset, you will have to accept more
buy offers, or create more sell offers.
At all times during trading, you will be able to see all active offers and their
respective trading prices. To create an offer, you simply enter a buy/sell price and
click either the “Submit Sell Offer” or “Submit Buy Offer” button to create a sell
or buy offer respectively. Note that your specified buy/sell price needs to at least
equal or better the best current buy/sell price. If you want to make a sell
offer, it must be ≤ lowest current sell offer. If you want to make a buy offer,
it must be ≥ highest current buy offer.
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Do also note that your offers must be rounded up to 1 decimal place. For
instance, you may key in a price of 4.5 or 5 but NOT a price of 4.55.
The following figure shows the trading window:
Note that your own buy/sell offers are also displayed in the list of offers in blue
instead of black. You cannot accept your own offers, but you can select them and
click “WITHDRAW” if you decide to withdraw your own offers.
Offers are removed from the offer lists when someone accepts or withdraws them.
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Note also that if there are any buy/sell offer that you are no longer able to fulfill
(either because you do not have any asset left for your sell offer or you do
not have enough ECU for your buy offer), it will also be removed.
After you have successfully made a trade, your ECU and asset balances will be
updated accordingly. In general, you should accept the highest buy offers and
the lowest sell offers. For your easier viewing, the offer lists will be sorted such
that the highest buy offer at the bottom of the list of buy offers and the
lowest sell offer at the bottom of the list of sell offers. (i.e, best offers are
at the bottom of each list)
In each period, you will have 3 minutes for trading. The remaining time (in
seconds) will be displayed at the top right hand corner of the screen.
The last screen concludes the period. It will show the average trading price
during trading and also reveal the value of the assets in this period: either 0 or 10
ECU. Your payoff for each period is the sum of ECU you have at the end of
the period and the total dividends from the assets. A new period begins
once every trader clicks “OK” on this screen.
A timeline summarizing the flow of events in each period is shown below:
Overall, you will be acquiring information and trading for 12 independent
periods. There will be 2 practice rounds for you to get used to the experiment
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before the actual 12 periods of the experiment begin. Note that the practice
rounds will not be selected as payment rounds.
If you have any questions that have not been fully answered by the in-
structions, please raise your hand and ask for assistance before proceed-
ing.
SECTION 2- QUANTITATIVE STAGE
In this part of the experiment, you will have to answer 10 quantitative questions.
These questions are designed to assess quantitative ability. You may write your
workings on the instruction paper for your convenience but your workings will not
be reviewed. For each question that is correctly answered, you will receive 2 ECU.
You will not be penalized for any wrong answer. You may also choose to
leave the questions blank if you do not want to answer. The maximum you
may obtain from this section is 20 ECU and the minimum is 0 ECU.
Do note that if you do not key in your answers before the time is up, the
computer will assume that you have left all questions blank. A warning
message will start flashing when you have 20 seconds remaining.
The payoff from this section will be added to your total earnings.
SECTION 3- DECISION PROBLEM STAGE
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices. How
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make.
The decision problems are not designed to test you. What we want to know is what
choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really would
choose.
For each line in the table in this stage, there are two options:
• Option A: 1 SGD
55
• Option B: 0 SGD or 3 SGD with varying chances stated for each line
Please select the option which you prefer for each line. Notice that there are a
total of 10 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for
payment. You do not know which line will be paid when you make your choices.
Hence, you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line.
After you have completed all your choices, the computer will randomly determine
which line is going to be paid. Your earnings for the selected line depend on which
option you chose. If you chose option A in that line, you will receive 1 SGD with
certainty. If you chose option B in that line, the computer will randomly determine
if your payoff is 3 SGD or 0 SGD based on the chances stated in option B of the
selected line.
QUESTIONNAIRE
In this final part of the experiment, you will be required to answer a questionnaire.
When you are done, we will prepare your earnings and ask you to sign a receipt,
and the experiment will be over. Thank you again for your participation!
If you have any questions that have not been fully answered by the in-
structions, please raise your hand and ask for assistance before proceed-
ing.
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